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93Abstract
An empirical multi-sector general equilibrium model is developed drawing largely from the
R&D-based  endogenous  growth theory  of Romer  (1990)  and  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1992).
Results  suggest  that trade  policies  affect  growth, but  in the absence  of international  technical
spillovers,  such effects  are  relatively  small.  R&D promoting policies  induce  private  agents  to
allocate  more  resources  to  R&D  activities,  which  increase  technological  spillovers  and  the
production of capital  variety.  The financial cost of the policies  evaluated range  from  1.3 to 2.7
percent of household income.  The corresponding  gains in social welfare are relatively large.
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94I. Introduction
A variety of empirical evidence indicates that national growth rates are correlated with
many economic, social and political variables,  including many that are affected by government
policies.  These observations on the disparity in growth rates among the world's economies led to
the formulation of models in which per capita income grows indefinitely  and long-run
performance depends upon structural and policy parameters of the domestic and global economy.
One strand of theory views capital accumulation, broadly defined to include human capital, as
the driving force behind economic growth (Jones and Manuelli,  1990, King and Rebelo,  1993,
and Rebelo,  1991).  A second approach casts external economies in a leading role in the growth
process.  Each firm's investment in either physical (Arrow,  1962) or human capital (Lucas,  1988)
inadvertently  contributes to the productivity of capital held by others.  The third approach,
pioneered by Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991)  focuses on the evolution and
adoption of new technology.  They develop analytical models wherein technological innovation
leads to the production of capital of different varieties and spillovers of technical know-how are
the engine of growth.
Empirical evidence in support of intra- and inter- sectoral spillovers reported in several
firm and industry level studies is compelling (e.g., Mansfield,  1983, and Bernstein and Nadiri,
1988, among others).  Bernstein and Nadiri, for instance, report intra-sectoral rates of return to
own R&D expenditure  in five manufacturing industries that range from  12 percent to 24 percent,
and corresponding inter-sectoral rates of return ranging from 16 to 45 percent.  Several studies
searching for spillovers have also been conducted at the national and cross-national level.
Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996)  added capital variety to the extended Solow model fit to data by
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of growth in OECD countries.  Still others suggest that product and process innovations  and
learning by doing are not the sole sources of economic growth.  For example,  Stiglitz (1996)  in
his review of the growth experience of East Asian countries,  suggests that the determinants  of
growth are caused by a host of market failures that vary by country and level of development.
Keeping in mind the gulf that still appears to exist between the various theories of growth and the
lack of case studies and broader based econometric  evidence to support one category of theory
over another,  it is nevertheless  insightful to empirically explore the effects of technological
spillovers and the production of capital variety on growth using a more detailed empirical model
in the Romer and Grossman and Helpman tradition.  In this context,  attention can be focused on
the extent to which a decentralized market economy provides adequate incentive  for the
accumulation of production technology,  and how variations  in economic  structures,  institutions
and policies might translate into different rates of productivity  gain.
In this paper we specify an empirical R&D based growth model whose analytical
antecedents draw upon Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991). Their models tend to
depict economies in more aggregated terms,  and focus on the steady state growth path.  In
contrast, the model developed here is calibrated to fairly desegregate  U.S.  data of the social
accounting matrix variety,  and solved for both the out-of-steady state and the  steady state paths
of the endogenous  variables.  Differentiated capital increases  in variety with technological
progress, and each capital variety is associated with a patent or blueprint.  Patents are in turn
produced by R&D activities.  Technological spillovers occur in R&D activities as the result of
knowledge accumulation.  Firms in the differentiated capital producing sector behave as
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Consequently,  as in its antecedents, the model entails two market failures, spillovers  in the
production of blueprints, and imperfect competition in the production of differentiated  capital.
Relative to its analytical  counterpart, the empirical model permits disaggregation  of the
economy into several sectors and allows us to investigate the magnitude to which government
policy affects sectoral production, private R&D activities, capital accumulation, economic
growth and welfare in a manner consistent with theory, and to assess whether these magnitudes
are within a range that is roughly consistent with economic history.
Limitations in data, however, condition the analysis of the growth effects of government
policies.  For example, no data series are available on the domestic production and flows of
technical know-how and the extent of spillovers.  In practice,  the international transmission of
knowledge cannot easily be separated from international  exchange  of goods and services.  Hence,
we have to ignore the international  exchange of technical information,  and assume that the stock
of technical knowledge accumulates  only by the country's own R&D  activities.  Lack of R&D
data for aggregate industries  is another limitation.  Furthermore,  in Grossman and Helpman's
(1994:  31) words, "what generally gets recorded  as R&D represents  only a portion of the
resources that firms spend on learning to produce new goods or with new methods", and thus, we
need to rely on calibration methods to obtain the necessary benchmark  for these variables.
Given the mentioned analytical,  empirical  and data limitations, this paper should be
viewed as an experimental  step to explore the properties  of an empirical  endogenous growth
model of the U.S. economy whose analytical underpinnings  are the R&D based growth models
of Romer and Grossman and Helpman.  Thus, the ongoing analysis illustrates the nature of
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growth theory, recognizing that there are almost surely other sources of economic growth that are
not captured by this model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section II we present the model
structure.  Section III reports and analyzes results from policy simulations.  Major findings  are
that while trade policies have some effects on growth, they tend to be small.  However, R&D
subsidies can have sizable impacts on the growth of the U.S. economy.
II. The Model Structure
The economy is presumed to have no effect on prices for final goods in world markets
(but the domestic prices of final goods are endogenously determined), and its R&D activities are
assumed to not influence the rate of accumulation of knowledge capital in the world at large.
This construction allows us to study the channels through which world markets influence
domestic behavior without being concerned  about feedback relationships  on growth from the rest
of the world (Grossman and Helpman,  1992:  144).
11.1.  The final output production  sectors
The model distinguishes four final output production  sectors:  (1) agriculture  and food
processing, (2) mineral and materials,  (3) manufacturing,  and (4) services.  With a constant
returns to scale technology, each sector produces a single output using inputs of two non-
augmented factors, labor (L) and conventional capital (B), one augmented factor and a set of
intermediate goods.  The augmented factor is a set of differentiated  capital where an element of
the set denotes a particular variety of capital.  Factors of production are perfectly mobile in the
economy, but immobile internationally.  Firms producing final outputs face perfect competition
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the four sectors is of Cobb-Douglas form, while the intensities of intermediate inputs are fixed.
Outputs of four sectors are demanded  in several different ways.  They serve as
intermediate inputs in the production processes; they meet final demand of households,
government and foreigners;  and they are employed to produce differentiated  capital variety.
Exports of each domestically produced good are derived from a constant elasticity of
transformation function (a CET function), while domestic demand for the domestic good can be
imperfectly substituted by a foreign good through Armington system.
11.2.  The R&D sector
In real economies,  research and development activities and the production of technical
innovations are often carried out by firms engaged in the production of goods or intermediate
factors.  In the model, for the purpose of simplification, private R&D activity is separated from
other production activities and aggregated into an independent  sector, which we define as an
R&D sector1.
R&D activities are often categorized as product and process innovations.  Yet, the R&D
product itself may be intangible and/or be embodied  in a service or intermediate  factor of
production.  In the model, the output of the R&D sector is "technological knowledge",  defined as
the number of blueprints -- technical patents produced.  This output, in turn, is a requirement
permitting the production of new types of differentiated capital.  R&D technology is presumed to
be of Cobb-Douglas form, with the two primary factors (L and B), and the pool of common
Since the market for the outputs of R&D activities is assumed to be perfectly competitive, R&D activities can
be viewedeither as a separate sector or as activities performed by the sector producing capital variety.
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the individual firm perspective, this technology exhibits constant returns to scale in its
employment of the two primary factors.  The key difference  from production activities in other
sectors is that the cumulative output of each individual firm's R&D activities expands the
common pool of technological knowledge to the R&D sector.  These technological  spillovers are
a positive externality which increases the productivity  of the two primary factors employed by
each firm engaged in the R&D production.  Consequently, spillovers are a source of
technological progress which increases the efficiency of producing additional blueprints.  The
blueprints enable the accumulation of differentiated  capital and sustain the long-run growth of
the economy.
11.3.  Differentiated  capital  and its  production
Growth is traditionally associated with capital accumulation (Krugman,  1994,  Young,
1995, and World Bank,  1993).  However,  "if life consisted of nothing more than adding
homogeneous capital to a homogeneous production process", it would be hard to observe  any
remarkable growth such as East Asia's success (Stiglitz,  1996).  In the current model capital
accumulation is modeled as the increase in the number of differentiated capital, k(i), where  i is
the index for one type of capital variety.  With a constant elasticity of substitution, various
capital varieties imperfectly substitute for each other in final good production.  The total number
of capital varieties  are equal to the numbers of blueprints available in the economy.  Hence, ie
{1,M}, where M is the number of blueprints produced over the interval from period 1 to t.  When
the number of blueprints increases, the number of capital varieties also increase and, hence,
capital accumulation occurs.
100Before a capital variety can be produced, investors must obtain a new blueprint or patent
by purchasing it from the R&D sector.  Once obtained, a property right to the knowledge
embodied therein is presumed to lie with the producer of the capital variety pertaining  to this
particular patent.  This right prevents others from producing an identical variety of capital and,
consequently,  ensures its producer monopolistic rents in the capital  variety market.  If the
property right cannot be enforced, then other firms would compete away the monopoly rents
accruing to the patent, leaving investors with no incentive to purchase  a patent,  nor for its
suppliers to incur the cost of its production.  Thus, monopolistic power is derived from the firm's
rights to a patent which permits it to charge a capital rental price above the marginal  product of
the capital variety it sells to producers of final goods.
Firms in the capital good sector have forward-looking  behavior, that is, they make an
investment decision to buy a new blueprint and to produce a new capital variety so as to
maximize the long-run expected returns from an infinite stream of monopoly revenues.  The
expected returns from an investment must be comparable with those from holding a 'safe' asset
such as bonds or bank deposits.  Thus, asset market equilibrium requires that for any firm
operating  in the differentiated  capital production sector, at any time period, the following non-
arbitrage condition must hold:
Pk(i) k(i)  +  AV(i)  =  r V(i)
where Pk(,)  is monopoly  capital rental price  for k(i),  and hence, Pk(,)k(i) is the revenue of a
monopoly  firm i in one time period,  V(i)  is the value of the firm i, and r is the interest rate on the
safe asset.  A V(i)  denotes  change  in the value of firm i with respect to time.  In equilibrium, the
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new blueprint purchased from the R&D sector (PR&D),  plus the cost of final goods employed in
the production of a particular variety of capital (MCk(,kki)).  Imposition of a transversality
condition to rule out speculative bubbles gives:
V(i)  =  Et=oR(t)[Pk)k(i)  ]
That is, the value of the firm is equal to the discounted value of the stream of monopoly
revenues,  where R(t) is a discount factor defined according to
R(t)  = H:(  1 + rs)  .
We assume that all differentiated capital goods are produced from forgone outputs
according to an identical constant-returns-to-scale  Cobb-Douglas production function.
Consequently,  all produced capital goods bear the same rental price, and final good producers
employ equal quantities k(i)  = k of each.  Given the identical Cobb-Douglas technology, demand
for final goods as inputs to produce a capital  variety has fixed shares in value terms.  Thus, the
marginal and average cost of capital good production caused by employing the forgone outputs is
the same for each producer of differentiated capital, and is determined from the individual good
prices according to:
where MCk is the marginal and average cost of each capital variety produced,  P is the price of
good j employed in the capital production, j = 1, 2, .., 4, ri,  is the expenditure shares of that good.
102Since all monopoly firms face the same prices of the forgone  outputs, the same cost of a
new blueprint, and the same quantity demanded  by the final output producers, each firms charges
the same mark-up rental rate, Pk(i)  = Pk, such that Pk = rMC/a 3, where  a3 is the substitution
elasticity of demand among different capital varieties for the final good producers.
11.4.  The household
Households own the primary factors and the equity of monopoly firms.  The
representative  household chooses aggregate  consumption and savings to maximize an
intertemporal  utility:
TC  t1 - - 1
Et-  (1 +  p)-'
1-c
subject to its budget constraint:
SAVt  =  WLLt  +  WBtBt  +  Pkt(Mtk)  - PCtTC t  +  TR t
where p is the rate of time preference,  a is the inverse of the intertemporal  elasticity  of
substitution, TC, is an index of overall  consumption,  PC,  is the price index for consumption,
SA V is household savings,  WL,t  and  WB,t  are unit price for the primary factor L and B,
respectively, M,  is the number of differentiated capital, and TR, is net government transfers.  TC,
in fact, is a composite of four specific goods according to fixed expenditure  shares.  Thus, the
price of overall consumption, PC,  is determined from the individual good prices, according to:
PC  =  8JJ(P/J)
103where yj is the expenditure  share of good j in overall consumption.
11.5. The government
The government has three functions in the model: collecting  taxes, distributing transfers,
and purchasing goods.  The government is presumed to follow a balanced budgetary policy for
all periods, and hence, its overall expenditure (transfer plus purchases) equals its overall income.
To avoid an unbalanced government budget, when a policy experiment affects  government
revenues, a lump-sum household income tax/subsidy is imposed to equate government
expenditures with revenues.
III. Policy  analysis
We illustrate the mechanics of the model with the aid of a series of experiments
addressing issues of foreign trade and R&D promotion.  The data on U.S. foreign trade reveal a
tariff rate of 19 percent for agriculture,  and zero for services.  To clarify the growth effects of
different policies, we first solve the model with all tariffs removed, and denote the resulting
transition path as the "base-run" against which the growth effects of other presumed policy
interventions are compared.  Results are reported for both the steady state and transitional
equilibria. The transitional dynamics  are derived from the time discrete model over an interval of
200 years, with the equilibria spaced one year apart.
III.1. Effects of  tariffs on growth
First, we simulate import tariff policies by choosing ad valorem import tariff rates of 30
percent, imposed first on the agricultural and food processing sector, and then on the
manufacturing sector.  Imposition of import tariffs in different sectors affects the growth rate
differently.  Protecting agriculture causes the growth rate to rise while protecting the
104manufacturing sector causes its to fall (Figures  1-2).  These results depend  critically on Stolper-
Samuelson like effects on the relative rental rates of primary resources and their effect on the
production of blueprints by the R&D sector.
The R&D sector is most labor intensive.  Among the four final good producing  sectors,
agriculture is relatively capital intensive, while manufacturing  is labor intensive.  Imposing a
specific tariff on one sector protects the sector's domestic producers  from foreign competition
and hence raises the sector's output.  An increase  in the output of the more labor (capital)
intensive sector's output induces it to employ relatively more labor (capital) than capital (labor).
As the R&D sector is the most labor intensive, the long run effects of a policy to protect a labor
intensive final good sector (manufacturing  in this case) negatively affects the production of new
blueprints by bidding up the wage rate, while a policy to protect a capital  intensive sector
(agriculture) stimulates the production of new blueprints  as wages fall.
The new blueprints produced by the R&D sector are purchased  by new monopoly firms.
When we observe an increase in the production of blueprints, we also observe  a concomitant  rise
in the investment demand for new blueprints.  The investment decision entails a comparison of
the investment cost of purchasing a new blueprint and the infinite stream of the profits obtained
from the monopoly capital rental price.  Compared with the  "base-run," we observe that
protecting the agricultural sector causes monopoly profits to rise more than the price for the new
blueprints, while protecting the manufacturing sector leads to the reversal of this result (see
Figure 3).  When the ratio of monopoly profits to the price of new blueprints rises, investment in
blueprints is stimulated and new monopoly firms are created.  Similar reasoning explains why
investment demand for new blueprints falls when the manufacturing  sector is protected.
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that an increase in new blueprints enlarges the pool of common technical knowledge (the public
good) and hence the output of new blueprints increases steadily.  As the source of growth in the
model is the accumulation of R&D outputs, the growth in the economy is stimulated.
Nevertheless, the trade protection effects on growth are relatively small.  Imposing a 30
percent tariff on the imports of agricultural goods, causes the long-term growth rate to rise by
only 0.045 percent, while a 30 percent tariff on the imports of manufacturing  goods causes the
rate of growth to fall by 0.08 (Table 2, rows 1-2, column 1). These effects are small since a one
percent increase from a base growth rate of 2.2 percent only reduces the time required for the
country to double its income by less than a single year.
Such small growth effects mainly arise because tariffs have a relatively small effect on
relative factor prices.  We observe that imposing a 30 percent tariff on agricultural  goods causes
the ratio of the prices for the two primary factors,  i.e.,  WA/WL,  to rise by only 0.22 percent, while
imposing a 30 percent tariff on manufacturing imports causes  WfWL to fall by 0.57 percent.
The small growth effect of trade policies stands in stark contrast with other empirical
evidence.  For example, Levine and Renelt (1992) use a panel data set for a large number of
countries and find the ratio of exports to GDP to be a robust predictor of economic growth;  and
Gopinath, Kennedy and Roe (1995)  report that economic growth is positively correlated with the
share of foreign trade in GDP.  Our model does not take into account the growth effects from
technological spillovers that might result from foreign trade in differentiated capital and
blueprints.  Thus, in light of other empirical evidence, we are left to conjecture that, at least for
economies which are relatively more dependent on R&D activities in other countries, the effect
106on R&D production from trade protection is likely to be swamped by the growth effects from
international technological spillovers that seem to occur when an economy is opened to world
markets.
111.2. Effects of tariffs on transition  paths
Next, we turn attention to the transition paths to the new steady state.  Interestingly, 90
percent of the resource adjustment occurs in the initial year.  After the first year, resource
reallocation continues, but the magnitude is small (Table 3, rows 12-14).  In contrast to the
"base-run", agricultural output rises 4.2 percent in the first year following  the imposition of a 30
percent tariff on agricultural imports, while outputs of the other three sectors fall.  For example,
manufacturing output falls by  1.6 percent (Table 5,  row 1).  If manufacturing  is protected by a 30
percent tariff, its output rises by 1.1 percent in the first year, while the other three sectors
experience a fall in output (Table  5, row 2).  As resource adjustments are small after the first
year, the difference in the sectoral growth rates along their transitional paths to the steady state is
also very small.
Irrespective of which final sector is protected by tariffs, more labor is employed in the
production of blueprints in the first year, but such increases are small:  0.1 percent when
agriculture is protected and 2 percent when manufacturing  is protected (Table 3, row 9).  In the
first year, the demand for capital falls by 0.2 percent when agriculture is protected but rises by
2.6 percent when manufacturing  is protected (Table 3, row 10).  These first year adjustments
cause R&D output to rise in both cases and to rise the most when the manufacturing sector is
protected (output of the R&D rises by 0.1  and 1 percent, respectively, in these two cases).
However, these first year increases in R&D output cannot support long-term growth as the final
107sectors compete for economy-wide resources  over the remainder of the path to the steady state.
As we discussed above, when a final good labor-intensive sector is protected by a tariff, it will
tend to bid away labor from the R&D sector.  We observe that after a few periods, labor departs
the R&D sector when manufacturing  is protected, while labor moves into R&D over the entire
path when agricultural is protected.  In contrast to the first year's adjustment,  labor employed in
R&D increases by 1 percent in the new steady state when agriculture  is protected, and falls by 2
percent when manufacturing is protected.
In a static model, trade protection policy usually lowers total welfare due to dead-weight
losses.  We observe that since the increase in the growth rate as a result of protecting agriculture
is small, the instantaneous felicity falls below the base run along the transition path and only
begins to rise when the path closely approaches the steady state.  The dynamic measure  of
equivalent variation presented in Mercenier  (1995, (see Appendix for the formula) shows a slight
welfare  loss of 0.01  percent when agriculture is protected (Table 2, row 2, column  3)2.  Of course
since protecting manufacturing lowered growth, welfare falls throughout the transition to the
steady state (the measure of welfare equivalent variation fall by 3 percent,  see Table 2, row 3,
column 3).
111.3. R&D Promoting  policies stimulate growth
In the context of this model, technical knowledge has two properties.  It is "non-rival" in
the sense that its use by one does not preclude its use by others,  and it is "partially excludable"
in the sense that a producer of differential capital obtains the property right to a blueprint at a
2 This measure is sensitive to the time-discount rate in the intertemporal utility function and substitution
elasticities between importable and domestic goods.
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differentiated capital cannot appropriate the blueprint due to the property right, the blueprint
nevertheless represents an increase in the stock of knowledge  which leads,  incrementally,  to the
more efficient production of blueprints.  However, the initial purchaser of the blue print is unable
to appropriate these additional returns to knowledge that the blueprint embodies.  Consequently,
the initial purchaser is only willing to pay a price which reflects the blueprint's value in its
production, i.e., a price that is lower than the patent's true marginal  value when account is taken
of the value of its contribution to the stock of knowledge that is available to all in the production
of additional blueprints.  The second market failure is more conventional;  imperfect competition
in the production of differentiated  capital tends to lower the scale of the output of each variety  of
capital.  In the absence  of public intervention, these market failures are likely to induce agents to
under-invest in the provision and acquisition of new technologies.  The correction of these
failures can, in principle,  lead to Pareto superior outcomes.
Many governments pursue various forms of support for education and R&D activities.
The U.S. provides tax incentives  for private  R&D investments and supports public investment
through the National Science Foundation and a number  of other agencies 3. To explore the basic
mechanism of these policies, we investigate two policy instruments  each of which promote
growth by encouraging  private R&D activity.  One instrument is an ad valorem  cost subsidy to
producers of R&D outputs (blueprints), and the other is an ad valorem rental price subsidy to the
employers of differentiated capital.  A subsidy to producers of R&D output encourages  them to
3However, according to the National  Science Foundation (1995),  the share of federally funded R&D in total
industrial R&D expenditures  has declined from 40 percent in 1953  to under  18 percent in  1995.  Since  1989, real
federally  funded R&D expenditures  declined by an averaged rate of 3.0 percent per year.
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that employers of differentiated capital pay a rental price that exceeds  its marginal product.  A
subsidy to the employers of differentiated capital  increases its demand, thereby providing
incentives to increase the production of differentiated  capital due to rising rents, which in turn
increases the number of new producers of differentiated capital and the production of blueprints.
A 10 percent subsidy is chosen for each of the policies.  A lump-sum household income
tax is imposed simultaneously to assure that the government's budget is balanced.  In the case  of
the R&D subsidy, the lump-sum tax is equivalent to 1.3 percent of total household  income,  and
accounts for 2.7 percent of household income in the case of the differentiated capital user's
subsidy.  A 10 percent R&D subsidy causes the growth rate to rise from a base rate of 2.2 percent
to 2.5 percent per annum in the steady state (Table 2, row 5), an increase of about 12 percent.
The base growth rate of 2.2 percent, if sustained, implies that US real income will double in
about 32 years.  A rate of 2.5 percent implies a doubling of real income  in about 28 years.
Interestingly,  in the case of the second instrument, the  10 percent subsidy to the
employers of differentiated  capital yields almost the same increase  in the rate of growth which,
as we show later, implies the two instruments have almost the same effects on the production of
R&D output in the two new steady states.  However, their transition paths vary as they cause
quite different resource adjustment among sectors.  Welfare gains from either policy are
relatively large and roughly comparable.  We focus on the more detailed effects of these policies
in the following two subsections.
Adjustments Induced by Subsidizing the Cost of R&D Production
The R&D production cost-subsidy  induces a relatively large reallocation of primary
110resources, the major adjustment of which mostly occur in the first few years (Table  4, rows 9-10,
column 1).  In the first year, labor and capital employed by the R&D sector increase by  11  and
13 percent, respectively.  After the first year's adjustment, inputs used by the R&D sector
continue to increase along the transition path.  However, contrasting  the new steady  state to the
first years adjustment, the additional increase in input levels amounts to only about  1 percent.
R&D output increases corresponding to the increase in the input levels.
When the R&D production cost is reduced by the subsidy, the price  for its output, new
blueprints, falls (see Table 4, row 1).  A lower blueprint price provides incentives  for new
monopoly firms to enter the capital production sector.  This can be seen from the results reported
in Table 4, rows 2 - 4.  We observe that although the monopoly rental price of each capital
variety and hence monopoly profits fall by 1.6 percent initially following the R&D  subsidy, the
profit relative to the cost of purchasing a new blueprints rises by  8.5 percent in the same year
(year  1).  The relative increase (not absolute increase) in monopoly profits provides incentive for
investors to increase the number of new monopoly firms and the production of capital variety.
Why does the monopoly rental price,  and hence profits per firm fall in the initial period?
(Table 4, rows 2-3)  The monopoly rental price  is positively affected by the two factors: the
marginal cost of capital production and the interest rate (see Appendix,  Equation (A5)).  Final
goods  are employed in the production of differentiated  capital.  With the exception of the
manufactured  good, the R&D subsidy causes the final good prices to fall (for reasons discussed
later),  and thus a slight decline in the marginal cost of differentiated  capital production.  The
interest rate also falls in the first year.  These two factors cause the monopoly rental price and
hence monopoly profits per firm to fall initially.  Consequently, the monopoly firms which
111invested in the production of capital variety before the shock suffer a fall in rents.  Later, with the
gradual rise of the interest rate, the monopoly rental price rises.  Monopoly profits per firm fall
along the entire transition path as the result of a decline in the demand for each variety (which
results from a rise in the price of differentiated capital),  and the increase in the number of
varieties of capital.  However, the increase in the number of capital varieties exceeds the fall in
profits per firm so that the sum of monopoly profits of all firms in the capital variety  sector
increase.
Changes in the prices and quantities of final goods  along their transition paths differ from
those in the steady state, and especially so in the initial year.  While the large increase in the
employment of labor and capital in the R&D sector increases R&D output instantaneously,  time
is required for differentiated  capital to accumulate.  An increase in the accumulation of
differentiated capital is required to "compensate"  the final goods sectors  "loss" of the primary
resources that are reallocated to R&D production.  Consequently,  the outputs of some final goods
must fall in the first few years following the R&D subsidy.
Household behavior evolves as follows.  Changes  in consumption and savings reflect the
outcome of inter temporal  decision over the entire time path.  Moreover, behavior is constrained
in each period by the requirement that domestic market prices adjust to equalize the value of total
demand to the value of total supply.  This implies that the household's response to an
unanticipated  shock that can increase  future welfare is to, incrementally,  forgo  consumption and
increase  its saving rate initially.  Consequently, we observe that household savings rise
throughout the time path, while household consumption falls in the first year and then rises along
the transition path.  However, the adjustment in consumption undershoots  its "base-mun"  path
112until period 21 (Figure 4).
The growth in savings, and hence in investment,  cause investment demand  for final goods
to rise throughout adjustment to the new steady state.  Since the share of manufacturing  goods
employed in the production of differentiated capital is relatively  large (76 percent),  investment
generates additional derived demand which accounts for more than  18 percent of total demand
for this good, while the total derived demand for other final goods is less than one percent.
Consequently, only the demand for manufacturing is strongly  influenced by the investment
demand, while changes in the demand for the other three goods mainly reflect consumption
demand.  Thus, in the first few years, and especially in the first year, the markets for
manufactured goods clear at a higher price and quantity while the markets  for agriculture  and
other final goods clear at lower prices and quantities.
In the long-run, increases in R&D output enlarges the pool of common knowledge (an
argument factor in the R&D production function).  Effectively, knowledge "spillovers"  increase,
which increases the productivity of the primary factors employed  in R&D production,  and thus
the output of blueprints rises steadily along the transition and the  steady state paths.
Concomitant with the increase in the production of blueprints is the increase  in capital variety.
The employment of a larger number of differentiated  capital in final good production in turn
increases the productivity of primary resources employed in final  good production.  Thus,
compared with the base-run, outputs for all sectors increase after the  20-th year.  In the 200-th
year, when the economy  closely approximates the new steady state, final good production levels
are 70 percent higher than the comparable  base-rm  levels.
Welfare gains are relatively large.  The equivalent variation index in response to the 10
113percent R&D subsidy registers a gain of 23 percent from the "base-run" (Table 2, row 5, column
3).  Recall that a lower consumer's  subjective time discount rate,  p4, implies that relatively higher
weights are placed on future consumption.  Consequently, the level of welfare  gain for a
relatively low discount rate is higher for any given rate of growth.
Adjustments Induced by Subsidizing Differentiated Capital used in Final Production
Similar to the R&D subsidy, subsidizing the employers of differentiated  capital causes a
relatively large reallocation of primary resources, and first year changes are comparable to those
of the R&D policies (Table 4, rows 9-10, columns 3).  However, the mechanism causing
reallocation is different than the former case.  In the former case, firms in the R&D sector bid
primary resources  away from other sectors.  In the case of subsidizing the employers  of
differentiated capital, the direct beneficiaries  are the final good producers.  The subsidy to the
price paid by them for differentiated capital inputs induces them to increase capital demand.
However, the monopoly price is a mark-up price chosen by the monopoly  firms based on the
marginal cost of capital production (exclusive of the cost of new blueprints of course)  and the
interest rate.  If  these two variables remained unchanged,  investors would not respond by
increasing the number of new monopoly firms to produce a larger number of differentiated
capital varieties.
We observe that in the first year the marginal cost of differentiated capital production to
fall, a result also observed for the case of the R&D subsidy.  However, in contrast to the R&D
subsidy, the interest rate rises by 9 percent.  The rise in the interest rate dominates the fall in the
4 To be consistent with the benchmark growth rate and interest rate, the time discount rate is relatively small
(about one percent).
114marginal cost of producing differentiated capital, thus inducing producers to raise its price.
Given the subsidy to employers,  the market for differentiated capital  clears  at a higher price to
producers and a lower price to employers of differentiated  capital. The rise in monopoly profits,
i.e., rents to holders of blueprints,  induces increases in forgone  consumption and investment in
new blueprints.
In other words, the rise in profits induces an increase in the number of new firms each of
which produce an additional new variety of capital.  Of course, this increase in demand  for
blueprints can only be satisfied by bidding up the price of new blueprints in order to stimulate a
supply response by the R&D producers.  Since primary factors are in fixed supply, their rental
rates also  rise.
In contrast to the base-run steady state, outputs for all sectors increase.  Thus, through this
process, different subsidy policies generate similar results, i.e., the R&D sector competes for
more resources to increase  its output, which in turn increases technological  spillovers  and a
higher rate of economic growth, and relatively large welfare gains.  The equivalent variation
index records a welfare  gain of 27 percent, 4 percent higher than that in the case of R&D
subsidy.
IV.  Conclusions
In this paper we introduce and explore  the properties  of an empirical endogenous  growth
model, the antecedents of which are the R&D based growth models of Romer (1990) and
Grossman and Helpman (1992).  The empirical model  is specified  and calibrated to U.S.  data of
the social  accounting  matrix variety.  The model is solved  to obtain both the transitional and
steady state equilibria, using the same software  used to solve  static applied general equilibrium
115models'.  To explore how selected economic instruments affect growth through their effects on
the accumulation of technological knowledge, two groups of policies, trade policies and R&D
inducing policies, are evaluated.  The results suggest that tariffs to protect producers of final
goods only have little effect on stimulating domestic production of new blueprints and the
accompanying  increase in the production of additional varieties of capital.  These results appear
at odds with analyses of time series cross-country  data.  The most likely reason for this
discrepancy is that the model does not take into account technological spillovers accruing from
trade, and thus suggests a direction for future research.  Spillovers likely accrue  from foreign
trade in blueprints and intermediate capital varieties, and when they are "mixed" with domestic
resources (as in reverse engineering) they lead to a more rapid advance of technological
knowledge.
The R&D promoting policies considered are subsidizing the costs of  R&D activities,  and
subsidizing the price paid by employers of differentiated capital inputs in which the new
technology is embodied.  Both of these policies have the effect of increasing technological
spillovers which raises the productivity of resources employed  in the R&D sector.  The cost of
these subsidies were to be covered by a lump sum tax on the household ranging from  1.3 percent
to 2.7 percent of total household income. The long-run growth rises by 12 percent, or, from
another perspective, the length of time for real US income to double is shortened by about 4
years (i.e.,  from 32 years to 28 years).
Other important insights suggested by the analysis concern how markets induce changes
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~h~  kerr A I  A hI  I I A AYin incentives affecting the level and nature of resource adjustments in various sectors of the
economy; their influence on savings and investment; and the "speed"of adjustments following
the imposition of a policy.  As a general rule, growth promoting policies channel resources into
R&D activities and into the production of differentiated capital, which in turn increased the
productivity of primary resources  (and the income streams from these resources)  in the
production of final goods.
Finally, this paper should not be regarded as an exploration of the determinants  of growth
in the U.S. economy per se.  Instead, this research illustrates and suggests the nature of insights
that can be obtained from an empirical application of a particular strand of the new growth
theory, recognizing that there are likely multiple sources of economic growth.  Our
experimentation with the new growth theory suggests that its empirical application is only
slightly more complicated than the application of traditional static computable general
equilibrium modeling, and that "off the shelf software"  is sufficient for its implementation.
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119Appendix I: Tables
Table 1. Benchmark values for selected variables and parameters
Variables or Parameters  Values
Share parameter for differentiated capital in final  0.283
production (a3)
Price of blueprints  (PR&DO)  30.086
Initial steady state growth rate (go)  0.022
Initial steady state interest rate (r0)  0.032
Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (o)  1.01
Subjective time discount rate (p)  0.01
Monopoly profits for each firm (no)  0.963
Initial quantity of each capital variety  (ko)  1.343
Initial total supply of differentiated capital (Moko)  1,343,273
Initial total supply of conventional capital (Bo)  896,020.6
Initial total supply of labor (Lo)  3,164,324
Table 2.  Growth rate, interest rate and welfare index under different policy scenarios (%)
Growth rate'  Interest rate'  Welfare index2
Base-run3   2.1998  3.1998  0.0
30% tariffs on agriculture  2.2008  3.2008  -0.0090
30% tariffs on manufacturing  2.1980  3.1980  -3.1320
10% R&D subsidy  2.4598  3.4649  22.6705
10% differentiated capital  2.4592  3.4644  26.6631
subsidy
1. Growth rate and interest rate are at their steady state levels;
2. Welfare index is the equivalent variation defined in Appendix;
3. Base-run is the simulation in which all tariffs are eliminated.
120Table 3. Effects of tariffs on some variables  in the first year and the steady states'
(% change from the "base-run")
30% tariffs on agriculture  30% tariffs on manufacturing
Year 1  Steady state  Year 1  Steady state
Price of R&D (Pr&d)  0.4709  0.4637  3.7479  0.9267
Monopoly rental price (Pk)  0.5027  0.5520  3.9512  11.3972
Monopoly profits (n)  0.4964  0.4951  0.3250  0.8692
TC/Pr~d  0.0254  0.0313  -0.4800  -0.0569
Saving rate  -1.4684  0.0116  -5.8856  -0.0213
WdW14  0.2274  0.2223  -0.5723  -0.5603
Output price5, Agr6. 0.7065  0.7071  -0.2680  -0.2671
Output price, Mfc 7. -0.0876  -0.0879  1.4338  1.4331
L2  demanded by  R&D  0.1027  0.0724  2.0518  -0.1318
B3  demanded by  R&D  -0.1733  -0.2045  2.5890  0.3757
L  demanded by  Agr.  4.3156  4.3062  -2.9881  -3.5161
B  demanded by  Agr.  4.0280  4.0177  -2.4774  -3.0257
L  demanded by  Mfc.  -1.5513  -1.5293  1.1146  5.9005
B  demanded by  Mfc.  -1.8228  -1.8017  1.6469  6.43 87
1. all variables in this table are constant in the steady state;
2. L is the input factor of labor;
3. B is the input factor of the conventional capital;
4. Wb is rental rent for B and W, is wage rate for L;
5. output prices are normalized by the current year output price index;
6. agricultural and food processing sector;
7. manufacturing  sector.
121Table 4. Effects of subsidy policies on some variables in the first year and the steady states'
(% changes from the "base-run")
10% R&D subsidy  10% differentiated  capital subsidy
Year  1  SS2Yearn1Ss
_r&d  -9.5466  -12.6265  0.8552  1.2005
Pk  -1.5957  8.3066  9.1621  8.2596
It-1.5957  -5.3866  9.2842  9.5687
/Prd  8.4748  8.2862  8.3575  8.2689
Saving rate  4.8391  2.8505  13.0199  12.6949
Wb/W'  -1.6744  -1.6797  -1.8209  -1.8220
Output price3, Agr.  -0.1168  -0.1169  -0.1266  -0.1273
Output price,  Mfc.  0.0780  0.0779  0.0846  0.0850
L  demanded by R&D  10.7214  11.6286  11.3615  11.5879
B  demanded by  R&D  13.0038  13.1324  13.3911  13.6588
1. all indicators in this table  are constant in the steady state;
2. the steady state;
3. output prices are normalized  by the current year price index.
Table  5. Chances in the GDP and outputs under different nolicv scenarios  (% chances from the "base-run")
Outputs:
GDP  Agr.  Mmn. 2   Mfc.  Ser.?
30% tariffs on agr.  Year  1  -0.1103  4.2063  -0.4812  -1.5872  -0.0232
__________54  0.1071  4.4080  -0.2761  -1.3655  0.1803
30%tariffsonmfc.  Year  1  -0.7582  -2.8648  -3.1700  1.1114  0.0149
_________SS  -3.0506  -5.7302-  -4.8606  3.3403  -2.4179
10% R&D subsidy  Year 1  0.1134  -1.8474  -1.3545  0.7241  -1.785
________SS  68.10  65.24  65.22  65.88  65.01
10% differentiated  Yearn1  0.1503  -2.1175  -1.3074  1.7510  -1.9390
capital sub.  SS  75.33  71.52  72.59  76.96  71.69
1.steady  state, and all variables in this table grow constantly in the steady state;
2. mineral and material sector;
3. service sector;
4.  the first year which  is sufficiently close to the steady state
122Appendix II: The mathematical presentation of the endogenous  growth CGE model
Glossary
Parameters
Ai  shift parameter in value added function
I'i  shift parameter in CET function
Ai  shift parameter in Armington function
Ak  shift parameter in differentiated  capital production function
a1l  share parameter for L in value added function
a2i  share parameter for B in value added function
a3   share parameter for differentiated capital in value added function
aij  input-output coefficient  for i used in j
i   share parameter in CET function for foreign good
ov  share parameter in Armington function for foreign good
0,  share parameter for L in R&D production function Ili  share parameter in differentiated capital production function for good i
Yi  share parameter in household demand function for I
emi  elasticity of substitution in Armington function
Cei  elasticity of substitution in CET function
p  rate of consumer time preference
a  inverse elasticity of intertemporal  substitution in consumption
Exogenous variables
Lt   labor supply
Bt   conventional capital supply
PWMi  world import price for good i
PWE  world export price for good i
Endogenous variables
PC  price index for household over all consumption
PXi  producer price  for good i
PD  price for good i produced and consumed domestically
PEi  price for good i exported
PMi  price for good i imported
Pi  price for composite good i
PVAi  value added price for good i
123Pm  price for blueprints
Mck  marginal cost for the production of differentiated  capital
WL  wage
WB  rental rate for conventional capital
Pk  monopoly capital rental price
Xi  output of good i
CC,  total absorption of composite good i
DX i   good i produced and consumed domestically
MDi  good i imported
EXi  good i exported
TC  household over all consumption
C i   household demand for composite good i
GDi  government demand for composite good i
IDi  investment demand for composite good i
ITDi  intermediate demand for composite good i
Y  household income
SAV  household savings
k  one capital variety 7r  monopoly profit for one firm
AM  new blueprints
M  the accumulated  R&D outputs
r  interest rate
g  growth rate
Equations
(For all within period equations, time subscript, t, is skipped)
The final output sectors
X  =  min(AILi  Bi  't  i k(s)a3,aliITDli,  a2ilTD2i,  a3rITD 3 , a4 ITD4i (Al)
a1  +a  =1-a  3  >O  ,  >  0 ,a 3  >  0 ;  a  >  0.
The R&D sector
124AM= AL0 B  1-M
m  m  m  (A2)
O>o
The differentiated capital and investment decision
(AMk +A2kM)  = AH"  ID.' k  r  1  r(A3)
MCk(AMk  + /AkM)  =_YJ1=1P11D 1   A4
rMC  k
a3   (A5)
it  =  (1  -a 3)Pkk  (A6)
t-mI
The intetemporal utility, budget constraint and consumption and saving decision
TC  1  - 1  (A8)
1 -a
TC  ==c  t  0<y  <1  ,y
1 SAV  = W  LLt  +  WB Bt  + PkMk +TR  -PCtTCt  (A9)
The CET functions and export supply
=rF,(.p  EX t 1+:e  e)/Ee 6 +(1  - p)DX j'  +  f  e/c  1 + e1)(AO
=:  £,1'  -(  +1  )  r)(A 
0  (  ll)
EX,  (pPXPE'  r  X.
PXX,  =  PD.DX. +  PEr  EX.  (A12)
125CC._-=  A.  U  D(em 1-1)c..,+  (1  _.D(e  ,-1)/mI  E  ei1  A3
MDi =  (,/M)mAm  1CC!,.(A14)
P .CC  . =  PD.DX.  + PM.MD.  (A15)
1  1  1  1  i
Factor market equilibrium
Ect 1PVAX,  +  OP  ALM=  WLL  (A16)
YJ~c 2PVAX,  +  (1  O  )Pm AM  =  WBB  (A17)
Yca 3PVA1X  = PMk  (A18)
Commodity market equilibrium
CC, =  C,  +  GD  l  + IDS  + ITD I  (A19)
Balanced payment condition
>3 1= 1(PWM1MD1  - PWEEX,)  = 0  (A20)
SA V  ==1  P.ID + PA  IM  (A21)
Knowledge accumulation





1261+r  1/  o
(  SS)  =  1  + gss(A24)
1+p
r  --  (A25)
Index of Equivalent vaiation
*[  T  E(  +=01+)TCt-  1 =(1 +p  )-[t  =  E 0 (1 + p)T'  -(A26)
1-a  1-o
where  TC,  is total consumption in "base-run".  That is welfare gain resulting from the policy
change  is equivalent from the perspective of the representative  household to increasing the
reference consumption profile by 4  percent.
Appendix III. The Data and the Calibration Strategies
The data used to create a static 1992 U.S. social accounting matrix are drawn primarily
from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)  data base (Hertel and Tsigas,  1995).  As these
are annual flow data, they must be augmented by information on capital  stock, growth  and
interest rates.  By normalizing all factor prices at unity, value of the income earned by capital
provided by the GTAP database can be treated as a measure of the stock of total capital.  From
this stock, conventional capital (one of the primary factors of production) and differentiated
capital have to be distinguished.  This is accomplished using the calibration restrictions implied
by the model.  The average 2.2 percent per capita real GDP growth rate of the U.S. economy
from 1986 - 1992 (World Bank, 1995)  is chosen as the initial steady state rate of annual growth.
The initial interest rate is 3.2 percent, the average rate over the same period on U.S. government
long term bonds.
Calibrating the model involves selecting values for certain parameters from sources
other than the primary data base, and then deriving the remaining estimates from restrictions
implied by the equilibrium requirements of the model.  The method used to calibrate parameters
or initial values of variables associated with intra temporal economic activities are quite standard
as that used in most static CGE models.  We only sketch the more subtle dynamic calibration.
As in static CGE models, where calibration is based on the assumption that data reflect an
127economy in equilibrium,  we assume that the benchmark data depict a steady state growth path6.
For simplicity, exogenous  growth is ignored, and the rate of depreciation for both conventional
capital and differentiated capital is assumed to be zero.  To assure the existence of a balanced
growth path, equality of the share parameters  for the differentiated capital in the value added
functions is required.  Also, we assume that 8 = a3, where 8 = l-l/e; e is the substitution
elasticity of the demand among differentiated capital varieties.  This parameter is calibrated from
the existing data together with the value of the R&D output (see Appendix, Equations (A26)-
(A27)).  The value of R&D sector output is specified by assuming the benchmark year's stock of
knowledge, M0, to be one million and (hence, benchmark year's R&D output equals Mo
multiplied by the growth rate, go.  Once the value of R&D output is specified, we obtain the
value of differentiated capital investment by subtracting the value of R&D output from the data
on total investment.  The capital rental price, Pk, is a mark-up price.  We normalize  it to unity and
derive MCk (the unit cost of forgone output employed in capital  investment)  from  a3Pkoro =
MCko.  In the steady state, the quantity of each capital variety,  ko, is constant.  Hence,  ko can be
calculated from the value of investment in differentiated capital divided by MCko and Mo, the
number of new blueprints.  Then, the supply of differentiated  capital equals  koMo.
The presence of an R&D sector, the output of which is difficult to measure for an actual
economy,  is presumed to largely be reflected in the data from the service sector.  The share
parameter of labor employed in R&D is chosen to be 0.9, so that the R&D sector is highly labor
intensive.  After these adjustments,  R&D spending comprises  7 percent of sales and 12 percent
of the GDP, while total investment accounts for 17 percent of GDP.  The share of differentiated
capital in the production of final goods is 28 percent.  The initial levels of selected variables  and
parameters obtained from sources other than the main data base are presented in Table  1.
The equations used in the calibration are defined as follows.  For clarity, we use bar to
indicate parameters or benchmark values for some variables which are specified exogenously  and
hat to indicate benchmark variables which are given by the data from the U.S. Social Accounting
Matrix.  Symbols without a bar or a hat are the values calibrated.
Define
ViEPVAiX, +P,, AM=  WL ,  +WB +PkkM  (A27)
where  WL = WB  = Pk = 1, B + kM are the value of total capital stock which can be obtained from
6  The steady-state assumption for the benchmark data is widely used in applied intertemporal general
equilibrium models.  For example, Goulder and Summers,  1989, Go, 1994, and Mercenier,  1995.
128the data as their prices are normalized to unit, and, hence,  ii can be obtained from the data.  AM=
gM.  PVA; are calculated from
PVA.  (1  - it)PX 1  -~d.P.  (A28)
and PX =P;=  1.
From Equation (A4) and (A21), we have
SAV  = MCOMk+P  AM  (A29)
since in the steady state, Ak = 0.  MCk can be calculated after we obtain a3 from Equation (AS).
Combining Equations (A5),  (A6),  (A25) and (A29) obtains
SA V(1  -a 3)  = PmAM  (A30)
Combining Equations (A22)  - (A24) and using Equation (A6) again obtain
a3 (1  -a 3)(V-PmM  )  =  rPM  (A31)
Equations (A30) - (A3 1) are used to solved for Pm, the price for R&D output, and a3, the share
parameter for each capital variety in the final production.
Once we have a3 , k can be obtained from Equation (A4) and then we get B.  The
adjustment of the service is done by subtracting PmAM from the original data for the value added
of the service.
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